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ABSTRACT   International actors, state and non-state, have embraced transparency as a solution to all 
manner of political problems. Theoretical analyses of these processes present transparency in a fetishtic 
manner, in which the social relations that generate transparency are misrecognized as the product of 
information itself. This paper will outline the theoretical problems that arise when transparency 
promotion is fetishized in International Relations theory.  Examining the fetishism of transparency, we 
will note problematic conception of politics, the public sphere, and rationality they articulate. 
Confusing the relationship between data, information and knowledge, fetishized treatments of 
transparency muddy the historical dynamics responsible for the emergence of transparency as a 
political practice. This alters our understanding of the relationship between global governance 
institutions, their constituents, and the nature of knowledge production itself.  Realizing the normative 
promise of transparency requires a reorientation of theoretical practice towards sociologically and 
historically sensitive approaches to the politics of knowledge.  
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The pursuit of transparency is a high-profile feature of global politics. Even a cursory 
survey of international policy practices finds countless initiatives designed to foster, promote, 
and increase transparency across a wide range of issue areas, from international development 
to arms-control and everything in-between. That this is a positive development is attested to in 
the mission statements and programmes of intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and throughout the organs of state institutions themselves. 
Transparency appears to offer a means of overcoming an underlying crisis of legitimacy in 
global governance, with access to information bridging the divide between global publics and 
the institutions of global governance.  
 International Relations (IR) has kept pace with these developments. A range of 
scholarship examines the operation of transparency, its measurement, its impact, and its 
potential drawbacks as a political project, across diverse issue areas. Prominent areas of study 
include global environmental governance (Dingwerth & Eichinger, 2010; Mol, 2010), 
international financial regulation (Best, 2005; Broz, 2002; Smythe & Smith, 2006), the 
relationship between democracy and transparency (Kono, 2006), alongside more general 
analyses of transparency in global governance (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Stasavage, 2004) 
and the methodology of measuring transparency (Andersson and Heywood, 2009; Hollyer, 
Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2014). These studies represent valuable steps towards understanding 
how current structures of global politics operate. As in related disciplines (e.g. Bianchi, 2013; 
Birchall, 2011a; Fenster, 2015) IR theorists have noted serious political and ethical limitations 
of transparency promotion and have questioned the extent to which transparent political 
practices can solve the most pressing problems of contemporary governance. 
2 
 
The sociological aspect of this literature is primarily concerned with examining the 
accountability structures of global governance institutions; the normative aim is to increase 
public knowledge as a route to enhanced democratic deliberation (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; 
Scholte, 2004). Unfortunately, weaknesses in how transparency is conceptualized and studied 
undermine both sets of objectives. In both positive and negative analyses of transparency 
promotion a conception of transparency as the exchange of information-objects between 
atomistic political actors is dominant. This is reflected in widely-used metaphors such as the 
claim that  ‘information is power’ – suggesting control of information is akin to control of 
physical objects – and strong corporeal metaphors such as that of increasing ‘information 
flows’. The causal effects of transparency promotion are attributed to these objects, rather than 
to historically- and socially-embedded practices through which knowledge is produced and 
disseminated. Attributing power to information in this way resonates with the everyday 
experience of knowledge structures within global politics, even as it obstructs the sociological 
and normative analysis of transparency’s emergence and operation. Understood in this way, 
transparency functions as a fetish: a form of productive power that aids in the reproduction of 
contemporary world order and furthers rather than reduces the alienation of citizens.  
While our focus is on academic and elite conceptions, fetishized understandings of 
transparency and information are common in popular discourse – ‘elite’ appeals transparency 
would not likely be a response to the crises of legitimacy if they were not. That the concept of 
‘transparency’ is widely assumed to be self-explanatory is reflected in its frequent use without 
explanation in the speeches and interviews of politicians and activists. Likewise, ‘personal 
data’ and information are now widely referred as objects that can be possessed or shared. The 
academic and institutional discourses we discuss here reflect this wider context. This paper 
charts the operation and implications of this fetishization. Our concern is not with whether 
transparency ‘works’ or with identifying new ways in which it might be pursued; discussing 
transparency in this register tends to remain within an instrumentalist framework which 
obstructs more careful reflection. Our goals are, rather, theoretical and programmatic, with 
empirical examples provided to illustrate our conceptual arguments. We draw on Critical 
Theory and related strands of Western Marxism to provide the basis for further and more 
detailed efforts to understand transparency as an analytical concept and political ideal. Through 
critique, we believe it is possible to keep the door open for alternative conceptions and practices 
which could compete with the dominant understandings of transparency described here.  
We begin by outlining the concept of fetishism derived from Marx and developed by 
Western Marxists  as the process whereby social relations between people ‘take the form of 
and are expressed through things’ (Rubin, 1924, p. 111). Having introduced the idea of 
fetishism, we turn to the various approaches to transparency in the literature on global 
governance and IR. Despite the distinctions that exist – between rational choice approaches 
and interpretive scholarship, or between causal accounts and normatively-oriented work – we 
note a shared, fetishistic tendency to treat transparency as the exchange of powerful 
information-objects between autonomous political actors. This tendency extends into the 
practices and discourse of international institutions and the civil society organizations created 
to monitor them.  
This analysis clarifies the tendency of both  ‘monitory’ and ‘participatory’ approaches 
to transparency to fetishize information. In the case of ‘monitory’ approaches to democracy 
and accountability in global governance, a focus on the formal disclosure and exchange of 
information obscures issues of substantive inequality. It also contributes to a political 
topography characterised by a sharp distinction between the public and governance institutions; 
fetishized transparency portrays the ‘international’ as a distant sphere of social and political 
activity. In participatory approaches to transparency and global governance, issues of access 
are carefully considered, but the historical and political character of knowledge production is 
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elided in favour of a transcendental conception of knowledge according to which it is 
discovered or unveiled, not produced, by social actors. This can be more or less effective, but 
what is discovered seems, problematically, to exist outside of history.   
We conclude that the fetishization of transparency places limits on the emancipatory 
potential of democratizing knowledge. Fetishized transparency obscures the historical practice 
of knowledge production and the political struggles that necessarily underpin all epistemic 
settlements. The implication of this misrecognition is the restriction of political possibilities 
and reproduction of public passivity and alienation. 
 
 
Fetishism, Reification, and the Recovery of Agency 
 
 In IR, Critical Theory has generally been associated with discourse ethics and scholarly 
‘reflexivity’. However, recent reconsiderations of this tradition in IR and elsewhere identify its 
core as lying in the materialist critique of a modern, capitalist society which is ‘unthinkingly 
destroying itself’ (Müller-Doohm, 2017, p. 254; Schmid, 2017). For many Critical Theorists, 
this critique partly concerns the epistemic dimensions of a social totality structured around the 
capitalist exchange principle, with the Marxist concept of fetishism representing a key 
influence. Locating Critical Theory in IR closer to the tradition of Marxist social theory 
reengages the project of ideology critique and its materialist interrogation of the ideational 
features of capitalist reproduction.  
The critique of fetishism points to a specific set of problems in many accounts of 
transparency in International Relations. While its close cousins, alienation and reification, have 
at times featured as central explanatory devices (e.g., Der Derian, 1987; Levine, 2012; Rupert, 
1993), fetishism has not enjoyed much prominence in IR (but see Roberts & Joseph, 2015). 
This is due, partly, to intellectual fashions, but also reflects discomfort with ideology critique 
and its epistemological baggage. Theorists wary of claims to objectivity, truth or essences have 
studied how discourses exercise power rather than examining the representation and 
misrepresentation of the social world.  
 As a concept in social theory, fetishism has a long and varied history. It is often 
negatively associated with Eurocentric anthropology, wherein it functioned as a pejorative 
description of the religious practices of non-Western people (Masuzawa, 2000; Pietz, 1985), 
tied to a teleological understanding of historical development. Recent scholarship has sought 
to move away from these uses, outlining how objects operate in social organization to bind 
groups together (eg. Graeber, 2003). While an interesting body of work, such studies often rely 
on a psychological understanding of misrecognition according to which the fetish is supposedly 
overcome by correcting the faulty understanding of the world.   
 By contrast, within the Marxist tradition fetishism is an objective property of 
capitalism. Marx’s short passage on commodity fetishism in the first volume of Capital (Marx, 
1976, pp. 163-177) formed the basis of much of Western Marxism, from the pioneering 
development of the concept in the 1920s by Georg Lukács, Evgeny Pashukanis, and Isaac 
Rubin to the Frankfurt School, Henri Lefebvre, and humanist Marxism in general (Lukács, 
1922; Pashukanis, 1924; Rubin, 1924). A turn to anti-humanism initiated by Althusser, and the 
post-1968 politics of discourse  – at least in its postmodernist guise – saw fetishism eclipsed as 
a workable concept to diagnose the ills of capitalist modernity. Its re-emergence as a tool of 
sociological analysis after two decades occurred after the rediscovery of fetishism by Critical 
Theorists seeking to recapture the political thrust of ideology critique (Dean, 2002; Honneth, 
2008; Rehmann, 2013; Zizek, 1989).  
 For Marx, commodity fetishism occurs when value appears to be a property of non-
human objects: 
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The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists…simply in the fact that the 
commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s [sic, as throughout] own labour as 
objective characteristics of the product of labour themselves, as the socio-natural 
properties of these things (Marx, 1976, p.165). 
 
In his more concise formula, fetishism is ‘nothing but the definite social relation between men 
themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things’ 
(Marx, 1976, p.165). Fetishism thus denotes when specific social relations are misrecognized 
and human relations themselves are experienced as the product of powerful objects.  
Commodity exchange flattens the specific use-values of objects into abstract exchange-values 
which treat unlike objects as alike, valuing objects according to how valuable they are in 
exchange, rather than their particular purpose or utility. The fetish extends from how we view 
objects to how we view labour, itself exchanged in the market and evaluated in exchange-value 
terms. From this lived experience and its symbolic representation, capitalist societies begin to 
extend the distinction between form and substance, or the universal and the particular, from 
commodity exchange to social existence writ large. Commodity fetishism operates to ‘flatten’ 
the unevenness of human society (Roberts & Joseph, 2015).  
 Fetishism was not, for Marx, purely psychological; it was an objective feature of 
capitalist society in which individuals enact the fetish on a daily basis – a material social 
practice as well as an ideological representation (Eagleton, 1990, p. 40; Zizek, 1989, pp. 15-
22). Ideology constitutes as much as it consolidates; we shall see how in the distinct social 
ontology suggested in fetishized treatments of transparency this process is in operation 
(Eagleton, 1990, p. 223). Nor are fetishes irrational or the product of errors of judgement, in 
contrast to the dominant understanding of misrecognition in IR (Jervis, 1976). Dispelling 
fetishism does not rest upon correcting an epistemological misunderstanding, but on theoretical 
critique and practical action to change the underlying social system.  
 Western Marxists extended Marx’s theory to account for processes and experiences of 
disempowerment in modernity. This tradition points to several specific problems arising from 
fetishization: the misrecognition of knowledge; a sense of distance from social structures and 
products; and the obstruction of politically innovative thought and action. For Lukács and, 
following him, Frankfurt School Critical Theorists such as Adorno, the extension of Marx’s 
theory rested upon the concept of reification (Lukács, 1922). As the ‘thingification’ of social 
relations, reification is ‘a process of forgetting’ (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1947, p. 191). The 
process by which the state, money, or knowledge is produced is misrecognized when fetishism 
becomes ‘the universal category of society as a whole’ and these processes are treated as things. 
The result, for Lukács, was that human consciousness becomes ‘contemplative’, rather than 
active (Lukács, 1922, pp. 97-98). Equal access to knowledge, rather than equal participation in 
the social activity through which it is produced, thereby becomes the focus of emancipatory 
political action. Reducing the opportunity of individuals and social groups to participate in 
producing holistic accounts of their social and political lives perpetuates disenfranchisement 
and circumscribes governance within clear technocratic limits.1  
 The extension of fetishism and reification generates political and social institutions 
which are experienced as a source of alienation (Lukács, 1922; Honneth, 2008). Any mundane 
encounter with modern bureaucratic governance, in which the human particular is subordinated 
to legal-rational rules, demonstrates this phenomenon. The overarching result is a sense of 
significant distance or opacity in our interactions with such institutions, an ongoing experience 
in which our everyday social practices do not seem to be related to the structures that govern 
them. For Adorno, the same experience was a feature of our relationship with the fetishized 
products of the ‘culture industry’ (Adorno, 1978). The productive moment of the fetish is 
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apparent in its ability to reproduce precisely the form of order that sustains it – the utilitarian, 
technocratic, and, at best, polyarchic institutions of contemporary world order.  
Fetishization also obstructs the reflection required for political progress, with 
positivism’s focus on appearance mirroring the flat ontology of capitalist exchange. Rather 
than obscuring reality with ideals, a positivistic ideology directs individuals to accept the 
surface appearances of society governed by the exchange principle – to be satisfied with access 
to the ‘façade made up of classified data’ (Cook, 2001; Adorno, 1974, p. 69). The more that 
social processes are understood as ‘things’, and the more that knowledge concerns the 
contemplation of these things, the harder it is to see how society could take a different form.  
As an approach to the study of transparency, Marxist Critical Theory has clear affinities 
to existing treatments of transparency rooted in critical social theory. The work of uncovering 
the deeply problematic assumptions that underpin transparency policies has been productively 
undertaken by scholars influenced by Derrida, Lacan, Weber, Simmel, Focault and the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (Birchall 2011b, 2011c; Horn 2011; Fenster 2006, 2015; 
Hansen and Flyverbom 2014; Flyverbom 2015). As a corpus of work, these approaches have 
significantly advanced our understanding of the ambivalences and limits of transparency. Yet, 
at the same time, they tend to emphasize the exchange and circulation of information over the 
moment of knowledge production. Moreover, in their stress on communication as always 
already involving moments of secrecy and revelation they tend towards theoretical idealism 
(Birchall 2011c; Horn 2011; Fenster 2015, p. 154). The supposedly inherent properties of 
communication thereby appear to be generative of transparency’s ambiguities. The result it is 
a relative neglect of the impact of specific institutional orders and of the historical specificity 
of transparency.  
Marxist Critical Theory, by contrast, points to the importance of the institutional form 
of modern global capitalism in any account of transparency (see also Dean 2002a, 2002b). The 
separation of the political from the economic, with its related division between the public and 
the private, central to capitalist social order creates the public space within which transparency 
may occur. At the same time, it introduces an ostensible separation between states or governing 
institutions and civil society, in which the authority to govern is seemingly granted to neutral 
administrative bureaucracies. The tendency to view information qua information, absent any 
substantive consideration of its content – of what counts as knowledge, and why this specific 
form of knowledge has been created – is, in part, a function of the apparent autonomy of 
political authority. Marrying consideration of these objective structures to their expression in 
political culture is a task for which Critical Theory was designed.  
 The critique of commodity fetishism aims to recover the agency human beings exercise 
in making the world under conditions not of their choosing. A central part of this task is the 
careful analysis of the theoretical categories we use to understand the social world, as these 
categories form a central moment in defining ‘realistic’ present and future political 
possibilities.  Turning to the literature on transparency in IR, we chart the theoretical 
implications that stem from treating transparency in the register of exchange value.  
 
 
‘The best disinfectant’: approaches to transparency in world politics 
 
 The drive to increase the availability of information about social actors, economic 
processes, and the actions of governments is embraced by a range of international policy 
initiatives. A positive view of transparency is articulated by policy-makers throughout the 
varied webs of global governance. Transparency promotion policies articulate a relatively 
uniform understanding of politics, despite the diversity of actors practicing them in different 
issue areas. For example, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) – an initiative founded by 
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Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the 
United States in 2011 – promotes transparency as central to the broad goal of strengthening 
governance (OGP, 2014). The IMF describes transparency as important to ‘achieving financial 
efficiency’ and ‘holding government to account’ (IMF, 2012). The G8 Lough Erne declaration 
likewise identified transparency as a ‘vital driver’ of good governance, a position endorsed by 
nearly every governance institution in the world (G8, 2013; WTO, 2016). In 2009, Pascal 
Lamy, then Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), defined one of the core 
missions of the WTO during the financial crisis in these terms, stating 
 
 The WTO has started monitoring measures taken by our members during the crisis, as 
 a device to provide transparency and, through peer pressure, pre-empt this dangerous 
 threat [of protectionism]. It operates on the principle that sunlight is the best 
 disinfectant. Like the canary in the mine, it tells us if we are keeping isolationist 
 pressures at bay.  
 
Transparency is presented as a means to increase public sector integrity, improve the quality 
of democratic participation, hold governments and corporations accountable to citizens and 
consumers, reduce corruption, monitor adherence to international agreements, and ensure the 
efficient operation of the global economy.  
 The academic literature does not uniformly share this optimism. Transparency is 
understood to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance, but only with 
significant qualification (Dingwerth & Eichnger, 2010; Gaventa & McGee, 2013; Mol, 2010). 
Despite this ambivalence, the concept of transparency within the broad global governance 
literature is seldom subject to sustained critical reflection. Definitions are presented in clear 
terms, but there is often little accompanying discussion of the epistemological or political 
assumptions that inform global transparency promotion (but see Stasavage, 2004).  
In contemporary treatments of transparency, fetishization occurs from two angles, 
occasionally simultaneously. One approach, developed upon the foundations of rational choice 
theory (RCT), focuses upon information as an objective factor in the causal explanation of 
political behaviour, defining transparency as the quantity of information present in a political 
system.2 Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014, p. 413), for instance, describe transparency 
as, at its broadest, the ‘full flow of information within a polity’ (also see Finel & Lord 1999, p. 
317). Similarly, approaches derived from game theory portray transparency as complete 
information within bargaining games. Transparency or its absence is of signal importance in 
determining political outcomes because access to information is supposedly central to shaping 
an actor’s beliefs, preferences, capacities and decisions. Within these approaches, transparency 
is the process whereby information transmission and exchange between actors takes place; 
information has the characteristics of a ‘thing’ that is possessed – an entity like a car or a laptop. 
These arguments tend to collapse knowledge into information and, as a result, significantly 
simplify the complex process of knowledge production (Burke, 2000, pp. 11-12; Sayer, 2000, 
pp. 12-22).  
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on a second strand of literature on transparency, 
(Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Higgot & Erman, 2010; Scholte, 2004; Smythe & Smith, 2006). 
Oriented to determining and, if needed, improving the legitimacy of global governance, this 
diffuse body of thought assumes that access to information is a source of political 
empowerment and/or effectiveness. For instance, Buchanan and Keohane argue that the 
legitimacy of international organizations is centrally determined by the flow of information 
between institutions, ‘accountability holders’, and civil society. In the absence of transparency, 
they argue, it can be assumed that an institution is not performing as it should and lacks 
legitimacy as a result (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, pp. 428-429). Transparency thereby 
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functions as a proxy in place of other indicators of legitimacy. Where mechanisms for 
democratic accountability are weak or non-existent, as in the institutions of global governance, 
this is particularly important.  
 
Sunburnt: Transparency as a fetish in global governance 
 
Despite the problematic relationship between transparency, accountability, and the idea 
of the ‘public’ often implied in this second body of literature, the shift towards a deeper 
consideration of epistemic politics (outlined below) provides a useful aid to the development 
of a fuller understanding of transparency policies, their power dynamics, and their limits. 
While the literature on global governance can be amorphous, constituting a very wide 
range of theoretical perspectives and areas of empirical analysis (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014), a 
central theme is the importance of transparency and accountability at international institutions 
such as the G20, the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF (Higgot & Erman, 2010; Scholte, 
2012; Slaughter, 2013). This focus is part of the broader concern with a ‘democratic deficit’ in 
global governance since the end of the Cold War. For practitioners and institutions involved in 
global governance, these concerns derive partly from the emergence of democracy as the 
legitimate international norm par excellence (Dingwerth, 2014, p. 1126, passim) and partly 
from a reaction to the small (but significant) anti-globalization protests at international summits 
from Seattle to Genoa to Toronto (Barnett, 2016; Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Slaughter, 
2013). This diverse body of literature is difficult to summarize without glossing over the 
distinct positions of different authors. Nevertheless, there is sufficient similarity in the accounts 
of transparency offered to justify treating these works together, even as they disagree about the 
specific form of democratic governance appropriate to the global sphere or to whom institutions 
should be accountable.3  
The core problem of transparency in global governance appears to be that those 
subjected to the authority of governance institutions ‘are not aware what decisions are taken in 
global governance, by whom, from what options, on what grounds, with what expected results, 
and with what resources to support implementation’ (Scholte, 2002, p. 294). Addressing this 
involves the disclosure of information across a number of registers, from the straightforward 
identification of individuals to the substantially trickier disclosure of criteria of judgement (an 
issue we will discuss in greater detail below). With information about decision-making 
processes, criteria, and conduct shielded from public view, the possibilities for holding 
organizations to account are limited. This gap between authority and accountability – a gap 
constituted by an absence of transparency – is understood to generate problems of inefficiency, 
distrust, and a general weakening of legitimacy.  
Within the dominant approach in the literature, transparency is understood as the 
disclosure of information by, for example, the IMF, World Bank, or WTO to relevant 
‘stakeholders’. Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 41) summarize the core claims of this approach: 
 
 The final component of accountability, information, may be the easiest to achieve. Crucial to 
 the efficacy of an information system for controlling abuses of power is that control over it 
 not be limited to power-wielders and the entities that originally authorized their actions. On 
 the contrary, the system should be open to new groups, seeking to provide information 
 relevant to the question of whether power-wielders are meeting appropriate standards of 
 behaviour – and to make that information widely available.  
 
This view of transparency as the disclosure of information to relevant actors is widely shared 
(Broz, 2002; Mavroidis & Wolfe, 2015). Drawing on liberal democratic political thought, often 
as reconstructed through principal-agent theory, this approach emphasizes the gains in 
legitimacy, accountability, and efficiency achieved through transparency. Realising 
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transparency in global economic governance is, in this reading, a question of designing the 
correct mechanisms and formal institutional frameworks of governing bodies.  
 
The limits of transparency 
 
The limits to transparency-driven accountability vary between issue area and the 
specific institutions under study. However, a number of difficulties arise from the fetishization 
at the heart of many accounts. While this literature is not idealistic about the achievement of 
transparency – it is widely noted that transparency promotion bumps up against power politics 
and power asymmetries – once disclosure policies are in place this framework suggests that 
information will generate positive political outcomes. Publics will be empowered and 
governance will become more efficient. One important question regards, of course, the capacity 
of different actors in international society to digest information disclosed (O’Neill, 2006). 
Structural inequalities limit the effectiveness of transparency promotion policies (Dingwerth, 
2014; Scholte 2012). Even after straightforward power politics have been overcome and 
information disclosed, differences between the formal right to receive information and the 
substantive ability to make sense of it persist. This is distinct from, although related to, the 
capacity of publics to access to information. When the latter point is stressed (e.g. Grigorescu 
2007) discussion remains within a distributive model of transparency. Equality of opportunity 
is the central concern, querying whether publics have the chance to access information, not 
whether they can actually take advantage of this chance. A sociologically richer account needs 
to grasp the production, exchange, and ‘consumption’ of information holistically. The gap 
between formal equality and substantive inequality highlights the limits of the distributive 
paradigm when divorced from issues of inequalities of epistemic power and the construction 
of epistemic legitimacy.  
Another issue has received less attention. When transparency is understood as 
disclosure it sustains a quite specific political topography, one which reflects the ‘distance’ and 
contemplative attitude generated by fetishism. For instance, in Keohane and Buchanan’s 
discussion of legitimacy, transparency is at the heart of a model according to which there is a 
stark distinction between the public or civil society, on the one hand, and structures of 
governance on the other. At one level, of course, the institutions governing the global political 
economy really are experienced by global publics as if they operate behind a veil. Issues of 
scale make this is particularly the case in international politics. Transparency promotion 
pursued through the wide dissemination of information, seems to represent a realistic solution; 
information will be transmitted through the barrier, reducing the ‘distance’ experienced by the 
recipients. At another level, however, the appeal to transparency reinforces the distinctions 
between governance institutions and publics, obscuring the social process through which the 
separation emerges and is perpetuated.  
If transparency reinforces the distinction between governance or the market and civil 
society, it also takes the form of a quantifiable, fungible property which, in the absence of 
deeper interaction, promises to bridge the gap. Just as transparency itself is fetishized by 
institutions seeking to demonstrate their responsiveness (Scholte, 2012), in Keohane and 
Buchanan’s account, it becomes a proxy for more demanding features of legitimacy (Buchanan 
& Keohane, 2006, pp. 428-429). In keeping with the connection between fetishization and 
contemplative knowledge, it helps to constitute and naturalise a view of the ‘global’ as a remote 
sphere of politics removed from the everyday concerns and practices of individuals, and access 
to which can only occur through engagement with the circulation of data modelled on 
exchange-value.  
The view of knowledge implied in this approach is that it is a property of data as such, 
an object which might be stored, exchanged, or consumed. In transparency indexes and the vast 
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digital archives of global governance institutions we see the fetish of transparency materialized 
(Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Fenster, 2015). The effectivity of the fetish lies not simply in 
the misrecognition this fosters, but in the social practices and materialization of this ideological 
belief. Calls for transparency from civil society actors are grasped in distributive rather than 
participatory terms – it is supposedly through access to information objects that the democratic 
deficit can be addressed. Whether or not this vision of monitory democracy can generate 
accountability and legitimacy remains an open question. However, we can query whether the 
simple monitoring of political decision-making in the absence of attention to global social, 
economic and political inequalities constitutes accountability or empowerment in any firm 
sense.  
 
 
Transparency, Participation, and Epistemic Democracy 
 
 A valuable shift in the literature on transparency and accountability in global 
governance is the increasing focus on the transparency of knowledge-making procedures 
themselves. This move promises to address some of the problems identified above by means 
of an account of transparency as the product of democratic participation. Drawing on 
deliberative and participatory strands of democratic theory, this approach to transparency and 
accountability is more demanding than its monitory cousins. It presents transparency as 
involving the participation of affected publics in the decision-making process of governance 
institutions across different facets of their operation. Steffek and Ferretti (2009), for example, 
stress the importance of two distinct goals of public participation: improved accountability and 
improved epistemic decision-making (Higgott & Erman, 2010, p. 465). Epistemic input, in 
which the public participates in the knowledge-making process through civil society 
organizations, is identified as a central aspect of making global governance more transparent. 
In highlighting the role of the public in constituting knowledge, Steffek and Ferretti begin to 
point toward an account of how knowledge is created through the complex interaction of 
multiple actors.  
This emphasis on epistemic agency appears to represent a move beyond the socio-
epistemic simplification arising from fetishization.4 However, Steffek and Ferretti introduce a 
problematic element into their discussion, one indicative of the wider problems with many such 
approaches. In evaluating international governance practices, they rely on an understanding of 
knowledge derived from the epistemic democracy literature (List & Goodin, 2001) in which 
epistemic participation is valued either in procedural terms or in the improvement in ‘truth-
tracking’ it realizes.5 On this latter view – the standard of evaluation used by Steffek and 
Ferretti – the ‘wisdom of crowds’ will help decision-makers reach an optimal outcome in their 
deliberations. As List and Goodin note, underpinning epistemic democracy is the claim that 
‘there is a procedure independent fact of the matter as to what the best or right outcome is’ 
(List & Goodin, 2001, p. 280).  This assumption confines Steffek and Ferretti’s assessment 
within the technocratic and undemocratic frameworks which constitute their object of concern. 
The normatively desirable outcome of increased democratic participation at the WTO or the 
World Bank is inappropriately extended to include an efficiency claim – the suggestion that 
greater participation is normatively desirable because it leads to better ‘technical’ knowledge 
(Steffek and Ferretti 2009: 43). At the same time, on this view, although civil society action to 
challenge exclusionary practices might be political, itis ultimately non-epistemic. As a result, 
the ideal of deliberation as a normative project of mutual recognition in which the force of 
better argument prevails is short-circuited as a standard to assess global governance. Epistemic 
participation is deprived of truly progressive force. It is not valued as an expression of 
autonomy, self-realization, or moral recognition.  
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Here, the fetishism of transparency relies on universalization at a deep level. It is not 
simply the assumption that all individuals will interpret information in the same manner that 
constitutes this fetish. An emphasis on democratic participation and the wealth redistribution 
required to achieve it moves beyond the distributive epistemology characteristic of rational 
choice approaches. Instead, it is the universalization of specific knowledge claims and 
procedures across both time and space that registers the degree to which information is 
represented as a form of exchange-value. Knowledge is still a quantity and is considered in 
quantitative terms. This ignores the important role of relations of power in constituting 
knowledge and its procedures, relying on a notion of facts ‘out there’ to which our ideas will 
conform, even as mediated through democratic procedures. Democratic governance is 
subsumed under the drive to achieve the correct technical decision, while the very constitution 
of what is ‘technical’ or the deeply contested grounds of expert knowledge are side-lined 
(Feenberg, 2002; Kennedy, 2016). Even Steffek and Ferretti’s participatory appraisal of the 
WTO views the social production of knowledge as revealing the world rather than making it. 
Extensive studies in the sociology of knowledge suggest that, in empirical terms, this move is 
problematic. As Shelia Jasanoff notes, ‘Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once 
products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; society cannot function without 
knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate social supports’ (Jasanoff, 
2004, pp. 2-3).   
This theoretical fetishization of transparency is matched in practice. In global economic 
governance, the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, are centrally involved in knowledge production 
– one of their main tasks in regulating and governing the global economy (Kennedy, 2016; 
Winickoff & Bushey, 2010; Broad, 2006). Their representations of knowledge production often 
reinforce the appearance of transparency as reified information, with the World Bank’s desire 
to become the ‘Knowledge Bank’, the ‘guardian and disseminator of the world’s development 
knowledge’ (Bretton Woods Project, 2004, p. 1, quoted in Broad, 2006, p. 407) indicative. 
However, detailed studies of these institutions illustrate precisely how knowledge-making 
involves multiple actors and institutions interacting over a long time-period. Consider, for 
example, how specific epistemic standards come into being through a knowledge economy 
involving institutions such as universities, corporations, think tanks, lobbying groups, and civil 
society organizations.6  
 As David Kennedy has noted, the background work of knowledge production in the 
global political economy is largely invisible to academics and publics alike. In his discussion 
of the role of the WTO in global wage regulation, Kennedy notes that ‘non-tariff barriers’ 
operated as background or accepted knowledge ‘through expert identification and naming’ 
(Kennedy, 2016, p. 117). Litigants, civil society, states and corporations contested whether or 
not a specific social practice was a non-tariff barrier, not the underlying value placed on non-
tariff barriers themselves. This starting point of knowledge production – the initial power 
struggle that led to this settlement – was obscured. Kennedy notes that low-wage industrial 
strategies often produced by the ‘non-tariff barrier’ norm appear to be determining: ‘they seem 
the inexorable result of economic forces that cannot be challenged in the foreground of political 
life’ (Kennedy, 2016, p. 118). While the WTO may produce and release volumes of 
information about their conduct and policies, the circulation of this information fails to reveal 
the far more fundamental ‘inner secret’ of knowledge production: its status as a historically 
embedded social practice. Access to information may make the organizations more accountable 
in some respects, but it does not make their epistemic authority significantly more transparent. 
Information released to global publics is the tip of a very large iceberg in which the (necessary) 
institutional mediation of knowledge production often remains below the water.  
Fetishized transparency generates a global political topography with two features. On 
the one hand, we find a distinct international sphere which confronts the public as a separate, 
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opaque realm. On the other hand, it is assumed that the gap between the two can be traversed 
by turning to an undifferentiated system of facts or data in which the technically correct course 
of action is waiting to be discovered. Deliberative and participatory accounts adopt a more 
sophisticated approach, but remain within a framework that underplays the political 
construction of epistemic categories. Their capacity to consider radical change is thereby 
considerably restricted.  
Objective structures of knowledge production in global governance – the institutionally 
embedded, historically enduring way in which knowledge is produced – combine with 
intersubjective understandings of knowledge, including those promoted in theories of global 
governance, to reproduce contemporary forms of epistemic authority in global politics.. 
Common-sense or ‘epistemic folkways’ (Gramsci, 1971; Fluck, 2016) that understand the 
prevailing form of reified knowledge as a ready vehicle to social empowerment legitimize 
transparency politics as the obvious solution to democratic shortfalls. As one of us as noted in 
another context, ‘Access to information appears to promise a route to the inner workings of 
political institutions, and thereby to power and influence’ (……).Widespread appeals to 
transparency in statements directed at the public reflect the extent to which this assumption has 
been naturalised; in a very different form, the structures of widespread conspiracy theories 
reflects a similar fetishization of facticity (Dean, 2002, p.12; Fluck, 2016). Calls for 
transparency as a route to empowerment are embraced by publics at local, national, and global 
scales. Whether expressed in polling data (Europe for Citizens 2013, Roper Centre 2016) 
newspaper campaigns such as those surrounding the Panama Papers, or the continued 
proliferation of transparency NGOs (numbering in the hundreds7), the fetish of open 
government is pervasive. Access to information is important, but faith in its empowering 
potential  misrepresents the nature of knowledge production and obscures social structures with 
fetishization at their heart. Realizing the normative and sociological promise of transparency 
requires an alternative which is historically sensitive to different forms of knowledge 
production.  
 
 
Realizing transparency in theory and practice 
 
In pressing for a richer sociology and ontology of knowledge production, Critical 
Theory pushes us to think about ways to realize epistemic practices that would facilitate 
genuinely democratic forms of global governance. As explained above, Critical Theorists point 
to several problematic results of fetishism: a sense of distance between individuals and society; 
misrecognition of the social character of knowledge; and obstruction of political innovation. 
Each of these problems is apparent in the case of transparency. The fetish of transparency 
contributes to a topography of global politics in which public and institutions seem to confront 
each across a void. Fetishized facts or information-objects, are presented as a bridge between 
governing and governed. Transparency’s role in theoretical discourse helps to reproduce the 
objective dominance of exchange-value in the phenomenological experience of the global 
information society. Through the promotion of transparency, publics are granted access to little 
more than the ‘façade of data’ in a manner which undermines attempts to formulate, identify, 
and pursue alternative political structures and practices. Evaluating the conceptual 
shortcomings of contemporary approaches to transparency in global politics, we have 
highlighted how their ahistorical picture of knowledge analytically underplays the role of 
collective human agency in producing transparency within specific socio-historical contexts. 
Modes of knowledge production defined by specific technologies, political economies, and 
related ideological discourses, are subsequently misrecognized. The fetish obscures the power 
relations involved in determining how knowledge is produced and represented. 
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Clarifying our theoretical practice is a first step in identifying the historically delimited 
possibilities through which transparency politics may begin to fulfil their democratic potential. 
It is important to recognize, in keeping with the animating impetus behind classical liberal 
accounts of transparency, that transparency retains sediments of its history as a progressive 
normative ideal.  Calls for transparency in politics express claims to moral recognition by the 
governed and the right to participate in their own governance – the essence of the democratic 
ideal that underpins the best aspects of the Enlightenment project. As stated in the introduction, 
our goal has not been to describe alternative forms of transparency. To do so would, we believe, 
represent an overextension of Critical Theory in the direction of the instrumental reasoning it 
seeks to avoid. However, , it is clear that the extension of democratic governance requires 
participation in forms of knowledge production that serve as the basis for public policy. This 
is not to enhance the ‘truth tracking’ or efficiency of knowledge production, but to enable self-
governance at the broadest possible scale. To borrow from Stirling’s work on participation in 
technological decision-making, unmaking fetishistic transparency requires a shift from 
informing to forming if transparency is to fulfil its promise (Sitrling 2008). What this would 
involve, exactly, is a matter best decided through political practice. 
The normative project of Critical Theory – emancipation as self-realization, with all the 
attendant distributive and social preconditions this entails – extends transparency beyond the 
limits of the liberal project to consider issues of substantive inequality, while retaining its 
insights. Sociologically, critique undertaken via the concept of the fetish places recovery of our 
understanding of collective human agency in the constitution of the social world, along with 
recognition of the objective conditions under which this agency operates, front and centre. A 
critical theoretic approach to transparency must be oriented to the complex relationship by 
which different social forces and institutions interact to produce transparency.  
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1 For a classic treatment, see Wynne (1989), on the tension between technocratic knowledge and the unrecognized knowledge 
of UK sheep farmers in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster.  
2 For a detailed discussion of RCT approaches to transparency see (…..).  
3 Moravcsik (2004), Goodin (2010), and Barnett (2015) offer good summaries of the literature and present distinct approaches.  
4 Steffek and Ferretti refer to certain kinds of knowledge as technical, or to experts as technical, and thus tend to sidestep the 
politics of these boundaries-making knowledge claims (Jasanoff 2004).  
5 There is some slippage between these in Steffek and Ferretti’s account. Higgot and Erman, by contrast, claim that WTO 
decisions reflect the dominance of ‘abstracted rationality’ but do not develop this point. Instead, they assert that liberal trade 
theory is correct; their argument is about how to legitimize WTO knowledge-claims (Higgott and Erman 2010: 468-470; cf. 
Winickoff and Bushey 2010: 373).  
6 On universities in global governance see Mittleman (2016).  
7 The Sunlight Foundation lists 543 local, national, and international transparency and open government NGOs.  
                                                 
